Let me second the recommendation on the Heidegger piece. I wrote about it a couple years back on LJ somewhere.

My prof is a rarity apparently—someone who largely disagrees with the aim of much of traditional analytic philosophy, that is, that philosophy should be mostly about defining and elucidating the foundations of science. I was under the impression that there has been a lot of work done in the last twenty or thirty years that has moved on past this view, but according to him it's still quite prevalent, in North America at least.

Umm. That's a broad statement. I mean, sure, for a long period--call it from Frege to Quine (Putnam? Fodor?), with Ayer, Russell, Carnap, Schlick, early Wittgenstein, Neurath, Hempel, Ramsey, etc. in between, that was a fairly honest characterization. But even then 'scientism' is almost an epithet, and certainly a gloss. Certainly analytic philosophy is still the dominant force in anglo-american philosophy departments. This much is agreed upon. What exactly analytic philosophy consists of is a contentious debate.

Writes Brian Leiter, editor of the highly influential Philosophical Gourmet Report,

There is, of course, an important sense in which "analytic" philosophy—as a substantive research program— is dead. The idea that intellectual labor is neatly divisible between philosophers and empirical scientists; that philosophers have a special method ("conceptual analysis") with which to solve problems; that philosophical problems are essentially soluble a priori, from the armchair—all these substantive commitments have largely died thanks to Quine and others. "Analytic" philosophy, today, is the most richly interdisciplinary of all the humanities—even if "analytic" describes only a style, not a substantive program of research. Indeed, what distinguishes analytic philosophy even more than "style" is its adoption of the research paradigm common in the natural sciences, a paradigm in which numerous individual researchers make small contributions to the solution of a set of generally recognized problems.

I don't think any sophisticated philosopher in a top-ranking department is actively trying, in this day and age, to extend, refine, defend or re-conceptualize Der logische Aufbau der Welt in any way. Carnap himself repudiated the work and in the end embraced something close to holism. So what set of untenable dogmas are held by these analytic philosophers? I'm not terribly clear myself. Nor is the difference purely methodological. Was Husserl a continentalist? He was trained as a logician under Brentano, but his phenomenological method led directly to Heidegger and Sartre; but he also influenced the mathematician Weyl and our friend the arch-positicvist Carnap.